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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Winner winner, chicken dinner . . . right?  Not so fast.  The thrill a 
private investor experiences after prevailing against a sovereign state in 
arbitration can quickly turn to frustration when the state refuses to pay up; 
cashing in is not as easy as presenting the award to a cashier—but maybe it 
can be. 
Investor–state arbitration is a dispute resolution procedure that offers a 
private investor a means to call upon a sovereign state to appear in a neutral 
forum and respond to investment-mistreatment claims that can lead to 
binding awards that carry worldwide enforceability.1  This sovereign 
generosity is a product of the explosion of foreign direct investment over the 
last several decades that led to the rise of international investment 
agreements (IIAs) such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade 
agreements (FTAs).2  These instruments include dispute resolution 
provisions that, more often than not, call for arbitration of disputes arising 
out of the agreement.3  In the event of a dispute governed by an arbitration 
clause, the provision provides for an arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over 
the parties.4  Although agreeing to submit to arbitration acts as a waiver of 
sovereign immunity as to jurisdiction, prevailing investors may encounter 
the obstacle of sovereign immunity following the arbitration when 
attempting to execute an award against a noncompliant state.5  If a state 
refuses to comply with an award, investors must set off on a worldwide 
search for assets held by that state; if and when investors find state assets, 
they must overcome the obstacle of sovereign immunity laws governing 
access to those assets.6   
 
 1.  CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 1–5 (2007). 
 2.  See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 
2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES, 84–86, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2012, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.3 (2012) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 
2012], available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf.   
 3.  See, e.g., infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 4.  See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.   
 5.  See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of 
Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The Re-Politicization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 211 (2010).   
 6.  See infra notes 148–165 and accompanying text (providing a very well-known example of 
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This Comment highlights the frustrating road that investors travel in 
search of assets when states do not honor arbitration awards and discusses 
how the World Bank Group can unify investor–state arbitrations to preclude 
such hollow victories for investors.  Part II introduces the contemporary 
framework of investor–state arbitration, including an overview of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or the 
Centre), a summary of the scope of noncompliance with investor–state 
arbitration awards, and the unique ICSID enforcement mechanism used to 
address challenges to awards and noncompliance.7  Part III provides 
examples of the challenges investors face in award execution proceedings in 
various jurisdictions with respect to amorphous sovereign immunity laws, 
and highlights the need for a non-judicial solution to the issue of award 
noncompliance.8  Part IV explores the feasibility of using the World Bank 
Group affiliates to alleviate the need to seek out assets of recalcitrant states 
in efforts to satisfy arbitration awards.9  Part V concludes.10   
II.  A BIT OF CONTEXT 
Since the Netherlands and Indonesia signed the first BIT offering 
investor–state arbitration in 1968,11 investor–state arbitrations have grown at 
an incredible rate.12  Treaty-based dispute cases filed under IIAs rose 
dramatically after the turn of the century, trending from a cumulative fifty 
disputes in 2000 to 450 by the end of 2011.13  These disputes have 
 
this phenomenon). 
 7.  See infra notes 11–65 and accompanying text.   
 8.  See infra notes 66–175 and accompanying text.   
 9.  See infra notes 176–248 and accompanying text.   
 10.  See infra note 249–56 and accompanying text.   
 11.  See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes (ICSID), Annual Report 5 (2012) [hereinafter 
ICSID, Annual Report 2012], available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request 
Type=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnualReports&year=2012_Eng.  
 12.  See UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note: Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 1 
(April 2012) [hereinafter IIA Issues Note 2012], available at http://unctad.org/en/Publications 
Library/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf (noting that 2011 had the highest number of treaty-based disputes 
ever filed in one year); see also MCLACHLAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 26–28 (providing an overview 
of the rise in IIAs).   
 13.  IIA Issues Note 2012, supra note 12, at 3.  This rise in disputes follows the rise in BITs over 
the past several decades.  Approximately 500 BITs and other IIAs (such as FTAs with investment 
provisions) existed in 1990; an additional 1500 IIAs arose throughout the 1990s, and then another 
1000 came to be in this past decade for a total of over 3100 at the end of 2011.  WORLD 
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compelled eighty-nine countries to respond in accordance with the dispute 
resolution provision found in the underlying treaty or agreement,14 typically 
through arbitration.15  Although claimants may choose from a variety of 
institutions or pursue ad hoc arbitrations, the clear majority of investor–state 
arbitrations occur through ICSID.16   
A.  ICSID: From Birth to Boon  
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) established ICSID 
 
INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 2, at 84.  The slowdown in pace of IIA growth is attributed to 
the rise of preferred regional agreements, which can do in one agreement what would otherwise 
require as many agreements as party pairs.  Id.  The shifting preference for regionalism is attributed 
to, inter alia, the increasingly controversial and politically sensitive nature of investor–state 
arbitrations.  Id.; see infra Part III.B. 
 14.  IIA Issues Note 2012, supra note 12, at 2.  Twelve countries have responded to ten or more 
claims, and three have responded to over twenty claims, including Argentina (fifty-one cases), 
Venezuela (twenty-five cases), and Ecuador (twenty-three cases).  Id. at 17. 
 15.  See 2012 Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 24 (“In the event that a disputing 
party considers that an investment dispute cannot be settled by consultation and negotiation: (a) the 
claimant . . . may submit to arbitration . . . .”), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of Canada 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, art. 22 (Sept. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Canada–China BIT] (“A disputing investor who 
meets the conditions precedent . . . may submit the claim to arbitration . . . .”), available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/china-text-
chine.aspx; Model UK Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 8 (“Disputes between a national or company 
of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party . . . which have not been amicably settled 
shall . . . be submitted to international arbitration if the national or company concerned so wishes.”), 
available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium/en/69%20volume%203.pdf; North 
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1120, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) 
(“[A] disputing investor may submit the claim to arbitration . . . .”), available at https://www.nafta-
sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=FullView&mid=1588&language=en-US#A1120. 
 16.  Cf. IIA Issue Note 2012, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that of the forty-six new disputes filed in 
2011, thirty-four were filed with ICSID).  Prominent international arbitration institutions include the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (Paris), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (Netherlands), the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
(Washington, D.C.).  See id.  Many international arbitrations are conducted ad hoc, without an 
institution.  Id.  The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Arbitration Rules are widely used in both institution arbitrations and, pursuant to their design, in ad 
hoc arbitration proceedings.  Id.  The majority of investor–state dispute settlements occur under 
ICSID or UNCITRAL by way of the PCA.  Id. at 1–2. 
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in 1966.17  The World Bank—or as it was known then, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or Bank)—sponsored the 
ICSID Convention in response to increasing calls for the Bank to play a role 
in settling disputes related to its operations.18  The goal of the ICSID system, 
as promulgated in the Convention’s Preamble,19 is to “promote much-needed 
international investment by offering a neutral dispute resolution forum both 
to investors that are (rightly or wrongly) wary of nationalistic decisions by 
local courts and to host States that are (rightly or wrongly) wary of self-
interested actions by foreign investors.”20  The Centre’s headquarters are 
 
 17.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 18.  K.V.S.K. NATHAN, THE ICSID CONVENTION: THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE 
FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 47–50 (2000).  Eugene Black, who served as President 
of the World Bank in the early 1960s, advanced the idea of a separate investment dispute settlement 
entity following his experience mediating disputes between member states and other member states 
or nationals of member states, including the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Corporation and 
expropriations of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt.  Id. at 47–49.  The ICSID Convention was thus 
a product of the Bank’s interest in settling disputes arising out of Bank operations balanced against 
the restrictions to its authority.  “Pressure mounted for the Bank to play a regular and effective role 
in settling disputes . . . but it was evident that the Bank would be stretching its mandate to do so and 
would be seriously diverted from its fundamental role of [reconstruction and development].”  Id. at 
49.  
 19. The ICSID Convention Preamble provides: 
The Contracting States Considering the need for international cooperation for 
economic development, and the role of private international investment 
therein; Bearing in mind the possibility that from time to time disputes may 
arise in connection with such investment between Contracting States and 
nationals of other Contracting States; Recognizing that while such disputes 
would usually be subject to national legal processes, international methods of 
settlement may be appropriate in certain cases; Attaching particular 
importance to the availability of facilities for international conciliation or 
arbitration to which Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting 
States may submit such disputes if they so desire; Desiring to establish such 
facilities under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development; Recognizing that mutual consent by the parties to submit such 
disputes to conciliation or to arbitration through such facilities constitutes a 
binding agreement which requires in particular that due consideration be given 
to any recommendation of conciliators, and that any arbitral award be 
complied with; and Declaring that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact 
of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention and without its 
consent be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular dispute 
to conciliation or arbitration, Have agreed as follows: 
ICSID Convention, supra note 17, Preamble. 
 20.  LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 4–5 (2d 
ed. 2011).  Exemplifying the nationalistic fears of foreign investors, an Ecuadorian judge recently 
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located at the World Bank in Washington, D.C.; despite its aim to be an 
autonomous institution, one may look no further than its Administrative 
Council (chaired by the President of the World Bank) to notice the 
inescapable influence of the World Bank.21 
ICSID operates as an administering body, not a permanent court.22  The 
Centre’s staff assists parties and arbitrators in constituting and carrying out 
arbitrations, and adopts governing rules of procedure used to supplement the 
ICSID Convention.23  A unique trait of the ICSID system is that the law 
governing the arbitration, the lex arbitri, is the Convention itself, and, thus, 
the same no matter where the arbitration takes place.24  Unlike international 
commercial arbitration, the ICSID system of investor–state arbitration is 
“self-contained and hence delocalized.”25  Substantive law remains at the 
discretion of the parties, with deference to laws of the state party in the 
absence of an agreement.26 
Chapter II of the ICSID Convention provides for the jurisdiction of 
ICSID,27 which is interpreted as comprising five elements: “(1) a legal 
dispute; (2) arising directly out of an investment; (3) between a contracting 
 
confessed to accepting a bribe of $500,000 from plaintiff-citizens for his efforts in orchestrating an 
$18 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in an environmental trial in Ecuador.  See 
Chevron, Press Release: Former Ecuadorian Judge Admits Role in Orchestrating Fraudulent 
Judgment Against Chevron, CHEVRON.COM (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.chevron.com/chevron/ 
pressreleases/article/01282013_formerecuadorianjudgeadmitsroleinorchestratingfraudulentjudgment
againstchevron.news. 
 21.  NATHAN, supra note 18, at 52–53.  Overlap with the World Bank operations is also apparent 
upon review of the Notes to Financial Statements included in the ICSID 2012 Annual Report: 
“IBRD provides support services and facilities to the Centre including . . . [t]he services of staff 
members and . . . [o]ther administrative services and facilities, such as travel, communications, 
office accommodations, furniture, equipment, supplies, and printing.”  ICSID, Annual Report 2012, 
supra note 11, at 59.   
 22.  NATHAN, supra note 18, at 51;  see also REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 9 (“The Centre itself 
does not conduct arbitration proceedings, but administers their initiation and functioning.”). 
 23.  REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 11–12, 123.  
 24.  See JACK J. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 53 (1997) (the seat of the arbitration typically provides the 
lex arbitri in international commercial arbitration, exposing the arbitration to varying degrees of 
judicial interference).  
 25.  REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 14; see also MCLACHLAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 55.  
 26.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 42.  
 27.  See id. art. 25.  Consent of the parties to arbitrate excludes resort to any other remedy; 
however, the dispute resolution provision may require exhaustion of local remedies as a prerequisite 
to arbitration.  See id. art. 26. 
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State; and (4) the national of another contracting State; and (5) which the 
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to ICSID.”28  The most 
notable aspect of the limited jurisdiction of ICSID arbitration is that it is not 
available for state–state arbitration or arbitration between private parties.29  
The latter disputes often fall under the auspices of the New York 
Convention,30 a similar multilateral treaty that notably provides for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in any of its 
Contracting States.31 
ICSID is the leading investor–state arbitration institution in the world in 
terms of caseload.32  The number of states signatory to the ICSID 
Convention increased from 30 in 1965 to 158 as of June 30, 2012.33  ICSID 
received a record thirty-eight case-filings in 2011, representing a clear 
majority of all investor–state disputes filed in that year.34  While the basis of 
 
 28.  MCLACHLAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 56.  The ICSID Convention is silent, or at best vague, 
as to the meaning of “legal dispute” or “investment.”  For further discussion on interpretations of the 
ICSID jurisdictional precursors, see generally NATHAN, supra note 18, at 99–154. 
 29.  See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 25 (explaining that the Centre’s jurisdiction 
extends “to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State . . . 
and a national of another Contracting State”) (emphasis added).  In 1978, ICSID adopted the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules, which allow the Centre to administer conciliation and arbitration of 
investment disputes where one party to the dispute is not affiliated with a Contracting State.  ICSID, 
Annual Report 2012, supra note 11, at 21–22.  The Centre also administers investment arbitrations 
conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and may serve as either appointing authority in 
non-ICSID Convention cases or offer services pursuant to agreements with other international 
institutions.  See id. 
 30.  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1968) [hereinafter New York Convention].  As of September 1, 
2013, 149 countries have ratified the New York Convention.  New York Convention Countries, 
NEWYORKCONVENTION.ORG, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention-countries/ 
contracting-states (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).   
 31.  See Giuliana Canѐ, The Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Revolutionary or Ineffective?, 15 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 439, 440–45 (2004) (comparing enforceability of ICSID awards to the 
overlapping yet more restrictive provisions of the New York Convention).   
 32.  See IIA Issues Note 2012, supra note 12, at 1–3.   
 33.  ICSID, Annual Report 2012, supra note 11, at 9–15.  Of the 158 signatories, 148 are 
Contract States, meaning those countries have deposited their instruments of ratification with the 
Centre.  Id. at 9.   
 34.  Id. at 5.  Compare id., with IIA Issues Note 2012, supra note 12 (citing a total of 46 
registered investor–state disputes in 2011).  The spike in investor–state cases at ICSID is also 
apparent by review of the average number of cases filed over the last four decades: one per year in 
the 1970s, two per year in the 1980s, four per year in the 1990s, twenty-four per year in 2000–2009, 
and thirty-five per year from 2010 through November 2012.  See ICSID, Annual Report 2012, supra 
note 11, at 7.  The ICSID Convention governs both conciliation and arbitration, though the “vast 
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consent to ICSID proceedings can take many forms, over three-quarters of 
all cases filed with ICSID in its 2012 fiscal year derived from dispute 
resolution provisions within BITs and FTAs.35  As there is a natural lag in 
the time between a dispute and the treaty or agreement it arises out of, the 
recent boon in ICSID cases is likely to persist despite the slowdown of new 
BITs and other IIAs.36  However, with more claims come more dissatisfied 
parties; in the last several years, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have 
withdrawn from the ICSID Convention (justifying the move on nationalistic 
interest and public policy).37  Such acts threaten the integrity of the ICSID 
system and jeopardize future legal claims of current investors and the 
availability of foreign investment in those countries.38 
B.  Compliance Check 
Investor–state arbitral awards carry higher compliance rates compared 
to awards from interstate or international commercial arbitration between 
private parties.39  The ICSID system carries built-in incentives for 
compliance as well as easily identifiable risks accompanying 
noncompliance.40  A state’s act of ratifying the ICSID Convention and 
 
majority of cases” are arbitrations.  Id. at 22. 
 35.  ICSID, Annual Report 2012, supra note 11, at 26.  
 36.  See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 37.  See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 2, at 87.  For a thorough analysis of the 
impact of ICSID denunciation following these acts by Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, see Diana 
Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for Change, 11 J. 
INT’L BUS. & L. 239 (2012).  
 38.  See generally Wick, supra note 37.  Pending cases are not affected by denouncement, 
including those filed during the six month window between official announcement of denunciation 
and the date it takes effect.  Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does 
and Does Not Achieve, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Apr. 13, 
2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-
not-achieve.  
 39.  See Loukas Mistelis & Crina Baltag, Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and 
Settlement in International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
319, 359 (2008).  
 40.  See REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 186 (“[T]he [ICSID] system is largely self-enforcing 
because Contracting States presumably recognize that blocking the execution of awards against them 
would alienate the very investors they are trying to attract by ratifying the ICSID Convention.”); see 
also ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(1) (“No Contracting State shall give diplomatic 
protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and 
another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under 
this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with 
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entering into a BIT or other agreement whereby it consents to ICSID 
proceedings is a signal to foreign investors that it intends to honor arbitral 
awards; compliance with awards provides a state with credibility and 
reduces political risk associated with foreign investment.41   
In addition to goodwill and other positive externalities encouraging 
compliance, negative consequences abound and provide perhaps greater 
incentive to states to comply with awards.42  By failing to honor an ICSID 
award, a state exposes itself to loss of credibility in the eyes of foreign 
investors and risks being ostracized by other Contracting States.43  
Furthermore, ICSID’s affiliation with the World Bank serves as a ready 
reminder of the ramifications to developing countries that rely on loans from 
World Bank affiliates.44   
While compliance is the norm in investor–state arbitration, exceptions 
persist.45  Noncompliant states come in many shapes and sizes, from large 
economies such as Russia to poor countries like Zimbabwe.46  
Noncompliance occurs more often in non-ICSID cases than ICSID cases.47  
Noncompliance in ICSID cases nonetheless remains a threat, especially in 
light of the recent decisions of several countries to withdraw from the ICSID 
 
the award rendered in such dispute.” (emphasis added)). 
 41.  See REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 186.  See also Anoosha Boralessa, Enforcement in the 
United States and United Kingdom of ICSID Awards Against the Republic of Argentina: Obstacles 
that Transnational Corporations May Face, 17 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 53, 66–67 (2004). 
 42.  See Canѐ, supra note 31, at 447 (finding that ICSID drafters thought investors were more 
likely to default than states, in light of the price of noncompliance to be paid by states through loss 
of international credibility). 
 43.  See REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 17. 
 44.  Crina Baltag, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against States, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 391, 
404 (2008); see also infra Part IV. 
 45.  See Luke Eric Peterson, How Many States Are Not Paying Awards Under Investment 
Treaties?, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., May 7, 2010 (finding at least a half a dozen declining to pay 
final awards rendered in investor-state arbitrations); see also Baltag, supra note 44, at 405 (finding 
roughly 20% of those corporations surveyed who had arbitrated against states or state-entities had to 
go through enforcement proceedings against states).   
 46.  See Peterson, supra note 45 (other noncompliant countries include Argentina, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Thailand); see also infra Part III.A. 
 47.  Cf. REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 186–89 (“[A]s of January 2010, foreign investors with 
favorable ICSID awards had pursued execution proceedings in only four cases.”) (Congo, Senegal, 
Liberia, and Kazakhstan were the noncompliant states); Baltag, supra note 44, at 403–04, 409–12 
(discussing the same cases involving execution proceedings).  Data is not comprehensive on this 
subject due to the private nature of many arbitrations.  Of the noncompliant states discussed in this 
article, six have refused to honor ICSID awards: Congo, Senegal, Liberia, Argentina, Kazakhstan, 
and Zimbabwe (for information on the latter three, see infra notes 60, 139, and 85, respectively). 
[Vol. 41: 117, 2013]  Precluding the Treasure Hunt 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
126 
system.48  As the number of investor–state disputes continues to climb at 
record-setting pace,49 the need to address solutions to noncompliance grows 
stronger.  ICSID’s enforcement mechanism, while more effective than 
alternatives, still allows states to have the last word as to whether they will 
comply with arbitration awards.50   
C.  ICSID’s Enforcement Mechanism 
The most notable benefit to ICSID arbitration over available alternatives 
is its unique enforcement mechanism.51  This mechanism rests in Articles 53 
and 54 of the ICSID Convention, which provide that an award is not subject 
to appeal and is treated in any Contracting State “as if it were a final 
judgment of a court in that State.”52  These provisions allow a prevailing 
 
 48.  See generally Wick, supra note 37. 
 49.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text.   
 50.  See infra Part II.C. 
 51.  See George K. Foster, Collecting from Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for 
Enforcing Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their Instrumentalities, and 
Some Proposals for its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 702–04 (2008). 
 52.  Articles 53 and 54 of the convention read as follows: 
 Article 53 
 (1) The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any 
appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.  
Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to 
the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant 
provisions of this Convention. 
(2) For the purposes of this Section, “award” shall include any decision 
interpreting, revising or annulling such award pursuant to Articles 50, 51 or 
52. 
 
Article 54 
(1) Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this 
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that 
State.  A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an 
award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall 
treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent 
state. 
(2) A party seeking recognition or enforcement in the territories of a 
Contracting State shall furnish to a competent court or other authority which 
such State shall have designated for this purpose a copy of the award certified 
by the Secretary-General . . . . 
(3) Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the 
execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories such 
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party to take a certified copy of an award to a competent court in any 
Contracting State and automatically receive the same rights to execution as 
if it were a final judgment issued by that court.53  This represents a 
significant improvement over the enforceability of awards under the New 
York Convention, where a court may deny enforcement of an award based 
on, inter alia, the public policy of the state wherein a party seeks 
enforcement.54  The ability to bypass judicial recognition and enforcement 
proceedings represents “a major potential advantage” over alternative means 
of dispute settlement.55 
ICSID does not completely tie the hands of parties following the 
issuance of an award; Section 5 of the Convention provides an avenue for 
interpretation, revision, or annulment of an award.56  Article 52, the 
annulment provision, represents the only challenge a dissatisfied party may 
make on the grounds of error, and these grounds are narrow and primarily 
procedural in nature.57  The review process is internal,58 leaving no further 
avenue for appeal.59 
Though greatly reducing the ability of a court to thwart arbitration 
results, the ICSID Convention does not go so far as to commandeer the 
sovereign immunity laws of a Contracting State.  Whereas participation in 
ICSID arbitration waives sovereign immunity from suit,60 Articles 54(3) and 
 
execution is sought. 
ICSID Convention, supra note 17, arts. 53–54. 
 53.  Id. art. 54; see also Foster, supra note 51, at 703.  
 54.  See Canѐ, supra note 31, at 444 (“Unlike the [ICSID] Convention, the New York 
Convention provides in Article V a list of grounds on which recognition and enforcement may be 
refused.”). 
 55.  Foster, supra note 51, at 703.  
 56.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 17, arts. 50–52.  
 57.  See id. art. 52 (“(1) Either party may request annulment of the award . . . on one or more of 
the following grounds: (a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has 
manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the 
Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that 
the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.”).  
 58.  See generally arts. 50–52.  An independent, ad hoc Committee conducts the internal review.  
See id. art 52(3).  
 59.  See Foster, supra note 51, at 702 (noting that if an award is upheld following an annulment 
review, “there is no basis for a State on the losing end of the award to resist compliance”).   
 60.  See, e.g., Blue Ridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, 902 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374–75 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding waiver of sovereign immunity as to jurisdiction) (“Given its status as a 
Contracting State to the [ICSID] Convention, as well as its participation in the ICSID arbitration, 
Argentina must have contemplated enforcement actions in . . . the United States as a signatory to the 
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55 preserve a noncompliant State’s claim to sovereign immunity from 
execution.61  The scope of sovereign immunity varies based on the 
jurisdiction in which an investor seeks execution.62  Article 55 provides: 
“Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force 
in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign 
State from execution.”63  Thus, the Convention’s enforcement mechanism 
takes the prevailing party to, but stops short of, the execution phase.64  In the 
event of noncompliance, execution of an award requires assistance of a 
competent court in a Contracting State.65   
III.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OBSTACLES IN ARBITRATION AWARD 
EXECUTION 
The rendering of an award in investor–state arbitration is not the end-
point in a dispute; receiving an award is merely winning a battle, whereas 
receiving payment is winning the war.  Indeed, while an ICSID award 
represents a major victory in the dispute, it may be a hollow victory in the 
event of nonpayment by the losing party.  In such instances, the awardee 
must scour the globe in search of assets in an ICSID Contracting State and 
determine if that state’s laws on sovereign immunity do not shield the assets 
from attachment in aid of execution.66  This costly and often fruitless search 
and seizure of state assets frustrates the goal and simplicity of the ICSID 
system.67   
ICSID’s model clauses provide an opportunity for investors to bypass 
the sovereign immunity obstacle of award execution by way of explicit 
 
Convention.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), aff’d, No. 12-4139-cv, 2013 WL 
4405316 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 61.  See REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 186; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.   
 62.  See Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 215.   
 63.  ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 55.  
 64.  REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 182–84.  
 65.  See id. 
 66.  See Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 217 (“The result is that the holder of an unpaid ICSID 
Convention award can seek enforcement in the courts of any ISCID Convention country, but its 
ability to recover will be limited by municipal laws on sovereign immunity.”); cf. ICSID 
Convention, supra note 17, art. 55 (ICSID award execution yields to foreign sovereign immunity 
laws in the forum in which the awardee seeks execution). 
 67.  See infra Parts III.A.1–2. 
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waiver of immunity from execution;68 however, states are reluctant in 
theory69 and obstinate in practice to agree to such a stipulation.70  Even when 
a waiver is present, a court may acknowledge the waiver in fact yet ignore it 
in law, according deference to either binding national sovereign immunity 
 
 68.  For example: 
Once [an] award is issued . . . the Convention does not alter or supersede the applicable 
national law of sovereign immunity from enforcement and execution of the award against 
the State.  In other words, the host State’s consent to arbitrate, although a waiver of 
immunity from suit, does not necessarily amount to a waiver of immunity from 
execution. 
  It is therefore imperative that foreign investors attempt to obtain from the host State an 
express waiver of sovereign immunity from enforcement and execution in the arbitration 
agreement.  ICSID Model Clause 15 provides possible language: The Host State hereby 
waives any right of sovereign immunity as to it and its property in respect of the 
enforcement and execution of any award rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted 
pursuant to this agreement.   
REED, ET. AL., supra note 20, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69.  Consider the following hypothetical: ABC Corp., based in the country of Eurmerica, 
negotiates a contract with the country of Atlantis’ Ministry of the Interior whereby ABC Corp. 
harvests deep-water pearls from Atlantis waters.  Atlantis agrees to include a waiver of immunity 
from execution of an arbitration award rendered pursuant to the existing BIT between Eurmerica and 
Atlantis.  Atlantis expropriates ABC Corp.’s assets, giving rise to ICSID arbitration, in which the 
arbitral tribunal issues an award of $10 million to ABC Corp.  If Atlantis refuses to make payment 
on the award, the waiver of sovereign immunity may allow ABC Corp. to seek execution through the 
Eurmerican courts using the Atlantis Embassy as assets.   
  This hypothetical demonstrates an extreme end of the effects of waiver of immunity from 
execution.  Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, diplomatic assets such as embassies or 
other assets used to support diplomatic functions are protected assets subject to immunity.  See 
Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov’t of Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.D.C. 1987) 
(finding the bank accounts of the Liberian embassy immune from attachment in aid of execution of 
an ICSID award); see also Foster, supra note 51, at 679.  But see Thai Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. 
Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, No. 10 Civ. 5256(KMW), 2011 WL 4111504, at 
*1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011) (allowing discovery of bank accounts held by the state’s embassy in 
the United States).  Similarly, it is likely that courts in other countries would tread lightly with 
respect to seizing the embassy of a sovereign state or assets supporting those diplomatic or consular 
functions, given the political ramifications.  See, e.g., infra note 71 and accompanying text.  This, in 
turn, lends support to using a multilateral non-judicial solution, which relieves the courts in the 
forum of execution of the political risks inherent in the presence of a waiver of sovereign immunity 
from execution of an ICSID award.  See infra Part III.A.1 (introducing the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act); Part IV (introducing non-judicial solutions). 
 70.  See Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 223 (“Most investment treaties . . . do not contain waivers of 
execution immunity.”); see also REED, ET. AL., supra note 20, at 188 (“The practical—and 
political— reality is that States and State entities, although willing to waive their immunity from suit 
in contracts by agreeing to ICSID arbitration, are reluctant to take the next step and waive the 
immunity of State assets from attachment by foreign investors.”). 
[Vol. 41: 117, 2013]  Precluding the Treasure Hunt 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
130 
laws or international laws of comity.71  Thus, notwithstanding waiver of 
immunity from execution of an ICSID award, a prevailing investor shoulders 
the burden of locating state treasure, then determining its accessibility given 
the sovereign immunity laws in the particular forum, and ultimately 
litigating against the defense of sovereign immunity raised either by the state 
or sua sponte by the court.72  If the court finds in favor of the state, an 
investor may go back to the drawing board and repeat the process as many 
times as he or she is willing and financially able to bear.73   
A.  The Quest for Reachable Assets 
In simplest terms, sovereign immunity from execution in investor–state 
arbitration protects sovereign assets from seizure by investors seeking 
arbitral award satisfaction.74  The landscape of sovereign immunity laws 
resembles a living patchwork quilt; some patches represent unique designs 
of different states (codified law) while others are in a steady state of 
alteration, representive of states that approach sovereign immunity issues on 
a case-by-case basis (common law or civil law).75  While there have been 
efforts to transform the quilt into a uniform blanket, such efforts require 
states to abandon national law (and the accompanying volumes of instructive 
precedent) and adopt international law; unsurprisingly, little success has 
transpired.76  Additional efforts abound to reform existing codifications in 
 
 71.  See REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 188–89 (“Even when the relevant State or State entity 
(usually) is prepared to provide a waiver of execution immunity, the investor must also obtain advice 
confirming the validity of such a waiver under the sovereign immunity laws of possible enforcement 
jurisdictions.”); see also Alexis Blane, Sovereign Immunity as a Bar to the Execution of 
International Arbitral Awards, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 453, 496–500 (2009) (noting the Ninth 
Circuit’s application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas 
(Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007), despite the presence of a waiver of immunity from 
execution of an arbitral award); August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning State 
Immunity From Enforcement Measures, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 803, 818 (2006) (discussing the practice 
of national courts in Europe interpreting waivers of immunity from enforcement in such a way as to 
avoid conflict with diplomatic immunity provisions such as those found in the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations). 
 72.  See Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 212–13. 
 73.  See infra notes 148–65 and accompanying text. 
 74.  See Foster, supra note 51, at 671.   
 75.  See Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 220–21.  
 76.  See id. (“The U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 
was adopted by the General Assembly on December 2, 2004, but has not entered into force.”).   
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order to ease the burden on creditors, such as arbitral-awardees, yet these 
efforts remain within the confines of secondary sources.77  The resulting 
tapestry of laws exposes investors to “judicial risk” and produces varying 
results in states with codified and uncodified sovereign immunity laws 
alike.78  The idiosyncrasies in codified and uncodified sovereign immunity 
laws qualify the judicial risk problem and add weight to the already 
formidable sovereign immunity obstacles. 
1.  Encounters in the U.S. 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act79 (FSIA) codified the shift from 
absolute to restrictive sovereign immunity and serves as the means for courts 
to assess jurisdiction over foreign states to determine what property is 
available to satisfy U.S. court judgments.80  Federal courts are the only 
avenue in the United States through which investors may seek a judgment 
and writ of execution against sovereign assets.81  U.S. courts have 
consistently treated sovereign property as presumptively immune, making 
attachment the exception and not the rule.82  The FSIA provides that 
 
 77.  See, e.g., Foster, supra note 51, at 719–21; Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 229–32. 
 78.  As used in this Comment, “judicial risk” describes the uncertainty inhering in execution 
proceedings brought by investors in jurisdictions with amorphous sovereign immunity laws.  See 
infra Part III.A.1–2. 
 79.  Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 80.  See Erin Nelson, Does an Individual Foreign Official Qualify as a Foreign State for 
Purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 853, 863–67 (2008).  The 
shift from absolute sovereign immunity (meaning just that—complete immunity from suit in the 
court of another sovereign) to restrictive sovereign immunity is attributed to increased international 
commerce involving states or state actors or affiliates.  Id.  The contrasting interpretations of 
restrictive sovereign immunity, as seen in the laws of different states, presents the bulk of the 
challenge to investors and their legal counsel in attempts to classify activities or properties as 
traditional sovereign functions and thereby protected from seizure or commercial and thereby subject 
to attachment in aid of execution of a court judgment.  Id.; see also infra note 83 (text of 28 U.S.C. § 
1610(a)).  For a more detailed analysis of the FSIA and its implications for investors seeking to 
execute an ICSID award in a Contracting State, see Foster, supra note 51, at 671–84.   
 81.  28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (2012) (“No attachment or execution . . . shall be permitted until the 
court has ordered such attachment and execution after having determined that a reasonable period of 
time has elapsed following the entry of judgment . . . .”); see also Foster, supra note 51, at 713–14 
(addressing the policy rationale of this requirement of waiting a reasonable time and noting that 
states must be afforded time to make voluntary payment and may need time to pass legislation in 
order to do so).   
 82.  See, e.g., Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 799 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 23 (2012). 
[Vol. 41: 117, 2013]  Precluding the Treasure Hunt 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
132 
property in the United States belonging to a foreign state and used for 
commercial activity is not immune under certain conditions and is therefore 
subject to attachment in aid of execution of a court judgment.83  
Additionally, any property in the United States belonging to an 
instrumentality or agent of a state engaged in commercial activity in the 
United States is attachable under certain conditions.84   
Investors must identify the assets they wish to use for attachment before 
seeking writs of execution.85  The first step, therefore, is identifying property 
used for commercial activity.86  The FSIA defines “commercial activity” as 
“either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial 
transaction or act,” and further explains that “[t]he commercial character of 
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of 
 
 83.  28 U.S.C. § 1610 provides: 
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) of 
this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune 
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a 
court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if— 
(1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or 
from execution either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal 
of the waiver the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the 
terms of the waiver, or 
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is 
based, or 
. . . 
(6) the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against 
the foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would 
not be inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement . . . . 
Id.   
 84.  Id. § 1610(b) provides:  
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States of an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States 
shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a 
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of 
this Act, if— 
(1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of 
execution or from execution either explicitly or implicitly, notwithstanding any 
withdrawal of the waiver the agency or instrumentality may purport to effect except 
in accordance with the terms of the waiver . . . . 
Id. 
 85.  See Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, No. 09 Civ. 8168(CM), 2011 WL 666227, at *3, 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (denying writ of execution against state instrumentalities due in part to 
failure of ICSID-awardee to identify property on which to execute).  
 86.  See Boralessa, supra note 41, at 93.   
[Vol. 41: 117, 2013]  Precluding the Treasure Hunt 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
133 
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 
purpose.”87  The “‘rule of thumb’” courts use to determine commercial 
versus public activity is “‘if the activity is one in which a private person 
could engage, it is not entitled to immunity.’”88  Thus, the nature of the 
conduct, as opposed to the purpose, places the focus on the means and not 
the ends.  Accordingly, it matters not that the purpose is a traditional 
sovereign function (such as clothing a state’s military); if the materials are 
procured in the same manner as a private actor engaged in international 
commerce, it is likely that the procurement will be treated as commercial 
activity.89  A state need not possess the property in question, but may simply 
retain ownership of it while in control of a third party.90   
The burden lies on the plaintiff-awardee to prove discovered assets are 
used for commercial activity and that an exception under §§ 1610 or 1611 
applies.91  While the standard for commercial activity is the same for 
arbitral-awardees and any other party that holds a judgment against a state, 
the FSIA provides a clear route to execution when “the judgment is based on 
 
 87.  28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012). 
 88.  Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov’t of Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.D.C. 
1987) (quoting Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
and Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 89.  See Foster, supra note 51, at 673–74 (utilizing Supreme Court opinions and legislative 
history of the FSIA to interpret the “commercial activity” definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1603).  Non-
commercial activity is likely to involve some sort of regulatory act or expropriation, whereas 
commercial activity involving state actors or affiliates can be anything from the sale of airline tickets 
or spices to foreign customers to the purchase of military supplies.  Id. at 674–75 (citing MOL, Inc. 
v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984) (export licensing deemed a 
regulatory act); LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, 228 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2000) (imposing 
taxes deemed a regulatory act); Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(expropriation), Kirkham v. Société Air Fr., 429 F.3d 288 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (airline ticket sales); 
Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist Ethiopia, 616 F. Supp. 
660 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (sale of spices); Ministry of Def. & Support for Armed Forces of Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 385 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2004) (purchase of military 
equipment), rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 450 (2006)). 
 90.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (governing exceptions for immunity from execution of property 
belonging to states themselves); id. § 1610(b) (immunity regarding property belonging to an “agency 
or instrumentality” of a foreign state); see also Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 225–26 (referencing the 
forced sale of a Russian-owned but third-party-controlled apartment complex in Germany identified 
by the investor-state arbitration-awardee to whom Russia refused payment).   
 91.  See infra note 95 and accompanying text.  Section 1611 of the FSIA addresses exceptions 
notwithstanding § 1610, such as central banks or property used for military purposes.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1611 (2012). 
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an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the foreign state.”92  
Thus, the critical hurdle is proving that state-owned assets are used for 
commercial activity.93   
Investors often receive little help from U.S. courts in efforts to identify 
foreign assets held in the United States.94  In Rubin v. The Islamic Republic 
of Iran, the Seventh Circuit held:  
[U]nder the FSIA a plaintiff seeking to attach the property of a 
foreign state in the United States must identify the specific property 
that is subject to attachment and plausibly allege that an exception 
to § 1609 attachment immunity applies.  If the plaintiff does so, 
discovery in aid of execution is limited to the specific property the 
plaintiff has identified.95  
The plaintiffs in Rubin received a judgment against Iran96 but had to conduct 
“[a] nationwide search for attachable Iranian assets” in efforts to satisfy the 
judgment.97  Plaintiffs identified ancient artifacts in a museum in Chicago, 
Illinois and sought attachment pursuant to § 1610.98  After Iran argued that 
sovereign immunity protected the assets, the plaintiffs went a step further 
and requested production of “[a]ll documents, including without limitation 
any communication or correspondence, concerning any and all tangible and 
intangible assets, of whatever nature and kind, in which Iran and/or any of 
 
 92.  28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) (2012).  Prior to the FSIA amendment in 1976, creditors were 
required to find commercial assets linked to the underlying claim.  See Canè, supra note 31, at 453–
54.  
 93.  This hurdle may carry more weight as a symbol than a milestone, as the majority of claims 
settle before investors present arguments in U.S. courts, thus providing incentive to the few states 
that do refuse to pay ICSID awards to wait out investor demands for payment until presented with a 
lower settlement figure.  See Baltag, supra note 44, at 413–14. 
 94.  See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 95.  637 F.3d 783, 799 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 23 (2012). 
 96.  See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 272–73 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 97.  Rubin, 637 F.3d at 786.  The judgment at issue arose from a suit filed in the district court for 
the District of Columbia for injuries suffered from a terrorist attack in Jerusalem executed by the 
terrorist group Hamas (sponsored by Iran).  Id.  While the underlying dispute was not arbitrated and 
did not involve investors but rather tort claimants, see id., ICSID awards are recognized and 
enforced as if they were a final judgment of the court, see ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 
54(1).  Therefore, the sovereign immunity exceptions as to the judgment in Rubin and an ICSID 
award are in equipoise as they relate to the FSIA.  Compare ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 
54(1), with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2012). 
 98.  Rubin, 637 F.3d at 786–87. 
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Iran’s agencies and instrumentalities has any legal and/or equitable interest, 
that are located within the United States.”99  The holding in Rubin reversed 
the district court’s order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for general asset 
discovery,100 leaning on the political deference and international comity that 
serves as the foundation of the FSIA.101   
While courts have not endorsed blank-check discovery with respect to 
sovereign assets, they may grant parties discovery of identified assets 
notwithstanding superficial showings of sovereign activity.102  Courts have 
even imposed limited sanctions against sovereigns that do not comply with 
discovery orders.103  Thai-Lao Lignite involved a discovery dispute that 
arose following the district court’s confirmation of an arbitral award under 
the New York Convention.104  The arbitral-awardee, a Thailand-based 
company, requested—and the magistrate approved—discovery of U.S. bank 
accounts held by the Laotian Embassy, claiming discovery was necessary to 
determine whether the assets were immune under the FSIA.105  While the 
court recognized the “aim [of protecting] . . . sovereigns from the burdens of 
litigation, including . . . discovery,”106 it believed “[t]he mere fact that assets 
are held in an account used by a state’s embassy does not per se render the 
entire account immune from attachment or discovery.”107  The standard for 
determining whether to compel discovery of sovereign assets instructs lower 
courts to “proceed with caution, taking into account the ‘comity concerns’ 
implicated in the ‘delicate balancing’” of the search for attachable assets by 
creditors and the statutory immunity claims of foreign sovereigns—hardly a 
 
 99.  Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100.  Id. at 801.  The district court, upon remand, settled on a more limited discovery plan, which 
as of October 16, 2013, has yet to conclude.  See Opinion, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 
1:03-cv-09370 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2012), ECF No. 610. 
 101.  Id. at 792–97. 
 102.  See Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Thai-Lao Lignite), No. 10 Civ. 5256(KMW), 2011 WL 4111504, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2011). 
 103.  See Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, No. 
10 Civ. 05256(KMW)(DCF), 2012 WL 5816878, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012).   
 104.  Thai-Lao Lignite, 2011 WL 4111504, at *1–2. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Rubin, 637 F.3d at 796–
97 (“Discovery orders that are broad in scope and thin in foundation unjustifiably subject foreign 
states to unwarranted litigation costs and intrusive inquiries about their American-based assets. One 
of the purposes of the immunity codified in § 1609 is to shield foreign states from these burdens.”). 
 107.  Thai-Lao Lignite, 2011 WL 4111504, at *4.  
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bright line.108  Finding that the limited grant by the magistrate struck such a 
balance, the district court overruled Laos’s objection to the order.109 
The only ICSID award-execution disputes to reach final judgment in the 
United States involve the same plaintiff—Liberian Eastern Timber 
Corporation (LETCO).110  The LETCO trials remind investors that no matter 
how long a court lets one count and categorize state treasure, unless the 
court grants a claim to the treasure, it is all for naught.111  The underlying 
dispute involved a concession agreement between LETCO and Liberia, 
reached in 1970, allowing LETCO to harvest and exploit Liberian timber.112  
The concession agreement included an arbitration clause that directed the 
parties to settle disputes through ICSID.113   Liberia eventually terminated 
the concession, which prompted LETCO to register a dispute with ICSID in 
1983.114  The arbitration proceeded ex parte, as Liberia refused to participate 
 
 108.  Id. at *5 (quoting First City Tex.–Hous., N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 150 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 109.  Id. at *7.  As of August 3, 2013, this contentious discovery process has yet to conclude. and 
the district court has yet to rule on whether the bank accounts meet the commercial activity 
exception within § 1610 of the FSIA.  See Docket, Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, No. 1:10-cv-05256-KMW-DCF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2013). 
 110.  See Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov’t of the Republic of Liberia (LETCO I), 650 F. Supp. 
73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d 854 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1987); Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov’t of the 
Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C. 1987).  For ongoing controversies surrounding 
execution of investment arbitration awards against states, see Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, 
893 F. Supp. 2d 747, 754 (E.D. Va. 2012) (confirming jurisdiction but transferring to the District 
Court for the District of Columbia for “the sole proper venue”); Thai-Lao Lignite, 2011 WL 
4111504; Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, No. 09 Civ. 8168(CM), 2011 WL 666227, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011). 
  Continental Casualty Co. presented a unique finding collateral to this discussion: the court 
analyzed Argentina’s challenge to venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (governing where a civil action 
against a foreign state may be brought) and held that because events giving rise to the claim occurred 
abroad (and that other subsections of § 1391(f) also did not apply), “the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia is the sole proper venue for this case.”  893 F. Supp. 2d at 754.  This 
finding may be attributed to the odd basis of the action, wherein the plaintiff-investor sought only 
confirmation, and not enforcement, of an ICSID award rendered in its favor and identified no 
property or other assets it sought to attach in aid of execution.  See id. at 748.  Venue may still be 
proper in “any judicial district in which . . . a substantial part of property that is the subject of the 
action is situated.”  28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1). 
 111.  Compare Thai-Lao Lignite, 2011 WL 4111504, at *7 (granting discovery), with LETCO I, 
650 F. Supp. at 77–78 (denying attachment). 
 112.  See LETCO I, 650 F. Supp. at 74. 
 113.  Id. at 74–75. 
 114.  Id. at 74; see also List of Concluded Cases, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front 
Servlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded (last updated Sept. 30, 2013) 
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and instead initiated parallel proceedings in the Liberian courts in an effort 
to resolve the dispute.115  LETCO received an award of nearly $9 million,116 
which the corporation immediately sought to execute in a federal district 
court in New York.117  LETCO received a writ of execution to serve on 
agents of Liberia that enabled it to collect registration fees and taxes due to 
Liberia; however, Liberia filed a motion to vacate the executions alleging 
the property was immune under the FSIA.118  Analyzing the nature of 
conduct to determine whether the fees and taxes were property used for a 
commercial purpose, the court found “[t]he levy and collection of taxes 
intended to serve as revenues for the support and maintenance of 
governmental functions are an exercise of powers particular to a 
sovereign.”119  The court sent LETCO back to the drawing board, noting it 
could seek satisfaction of the ICSID award elsewhere so long as the 
identified property met the narrow exceptions of the FSIA.120 
LETCO later recorded its judgment in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia and received writs of execution to seize bank accounts 
held by the Embassy of Liberia in Washington, D.C.121  Liberia again 
claimed sovereign immunity over the property and again prevailed.122  The 
court found the property to be immune from attachment not only under the 
 
(listing the LETCO ICSID case as number fifteen on a list of 271 cases and providing details about 
the case). 
 115.  LETCO I, 650 F. Supp. at 75. 
 116.  All monetary values in this article are expressed in United States Dollars (USD) unless 
otherwise stated. 
 117.  LETCO I, 650 F. Supp. at 75. 
 118.  Id. at 75, 77.  Liberia also challenged the jurisdiction of the court to issue the judgment 
enforcing the ICSID award.  Id. at 75.  The court found that Liberia, an ICSID Contracting State, 
waived its jurisdictional immunity when it agreed to settle any dispute under the concession 
agreement under ICSID.  Id. at 76 (citing Article 54 of the ICSID Convention). 
 119.  Id. at 77–78.  LETCO argued that the portion of the gross receipts from collections retained 
to pay for the services of U.S. corporations and citizens represented commercial activities within the 
meaning of the FSIA.  Id. at 77.  The court rejected this argument, however, finding the nature of 
collections to be constant regardless of the chosen method of collection.  Id. 
 120.  See id. at 78.  This decision preceded the 1988 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) that 
resulted in what is now § 1610(a)(6).  See supra note 83.  
 121.  Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov’t of the Republic of Liberia (LETCO II), 659 F. Supp. 606, 
607–08 (D.D.C. 1987).  The writs authorized LETCO to seize “any credits other than wages, salary, 
commissions or pensions of the defendant, The Government of the Republic of Liberia . . . The 
Embassy . . . or any of their agencies, that are used for commercial activities . . . .”  Id. at 607 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 122.  Id. at 606, 611.   
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FSIA but also under the Vienna Convention.123  Liberia stated it used the 
bank accounts in question “to perform its diplomatic and consular functions” 
such as “payment of salaries and wages of diplomatic personnel and various 
ongoing expenses . . . necessary to the proper functioning of the 
Embassy.”124  The court deemed the “essential character” of the funds was 
public, as “only a governmental entity may use funds to perform the 
functions unique to an embassy.”125  While recognizing that some of the 
funds may be used for commercial activities and therefore available for 
attachment, the court found the hardship to the foreign mission outweighed 
the interest of the investor.126 
In sum, investors face a path that proves difficult to reconnoiter in their 
hunt for state treasure.  Applications of the FSIA are inconsistent and based 
on an amorphous standard of discretion that dashes hopes of reversal on 
appeal.  Judicial and political deference to international comity, as 
demonstrated in the above case studies, occurs with equal frequency abroad.    
2.  Encounters in the E.U. 
Investors may find a less chafing path towards award-execution 
abroad;127 indeed, parties to over three-quarters of the ICSID awards that are 
accompanied by national court decisions chose to call on court systems 
found outside the United States.128  The same issues complicating award 
execution in the United States, however, similarly plague execution efforts 
abroad: investors must not only locate state treasure but also overcome the 
 
 123.  Id. at 608–11.  While the court conceded that no specific provision of the Vienna 
Convention afforded immunity to bank accounts used for the diplomatic mission, the court 
determined that allowing attachment would be “inconsistent with . . . the intention of the parties to 
the Vienna Convention.”  Id. at 608; see Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional 
Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
17843.pdf.  
 124.  LETCO II, 659 F. Supp. at 610 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id.  The court also opined that requiring diplomats to segregate public from commercial 
funds in order to avoid attachment of public funds (and consequently aiding attachment of 
commercial funds) was not wise as it was hard enough for courts to make such classifications.  See 
id.   
 127.  See Boralessa, supra note 41, at 93 (comparing laws regarding execution immunity in the 
U.S. and U.K.).  
 128.  See List of Concluded Cases, supra note 114 (seven out of nine concluded ICSID cases that 
are accompanied by national court decisions were pursued in courts outside of the United States). 
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defense of sovereign immunity.129  Similar to the United States, most 
European states have evolved from an absolute immunity concept with 
respect to enforcement measures against foreign states.130  For example, the 
State Immunity Act (SIA) of 1978 codified sovereign immunity law in the 
United Kingdom and replaced the practice of quasi-absolute immunity found 
in the English common law.131  The pertinent section of the Act for purposes 
of this discussion is Section 13, which provides that state property “[that] is 
for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes” is not 
immune from “any process for the enforcement of a judgment or arbitration 
award.”132  Outside of the United Kingdom, many multilateral endeavors to 
create a uniform approach to sovereign immunity have transpired over the 
past several decades, yet few codifications amount to statutory law and thus 
they largely remain only persuasive authority.133  Nevertheless, 
contemporary European case law suggests a trend in sovereign immunity 
laws of allowing execution against “property clearly serving non-
 
 129.  Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 225–29. 
 130.  See Reinisch, supra note 71, at 804–07.  The slow adoption of the restrictive immunity 
theory first applied to jurisdictional immunity, yet many states continued to view immunity from 
execution as absolute.  Id. at 804 (citing “the more intrusive character of enforcement measures” vis-
à-vis adjudicatory powers as the basis for the hesitation of states to abandon an absolute view of 
execution immunity).   
 131.  See State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukp-
ga/1978/33; see also AIG Capital Partners, Inc. v. Republic of Kazakhstan (AIG, Inc.), [2005] 
EWHC (Comm) 2239, [22], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1420 (Eng.). 
 132.  Section 13 of the State Immunity Act provides, in part: 
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below— 
(a) relief shall not be given against a state by way of injunction or order for specific 
performance or for the recovery of land or other property; and 
(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement of 
a judgment or arbitration award or, in an action in rem, for its arrest, detention or 
sale. 
(3) Subsection (2) above does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any 
process with the written consent of the State concerned; and any such consent (which 
may be contained in a prior agreement) may be expressed so as to apply to a limited 
extent or generally; but a provision merely submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts is 
not to be regarded as a consent for the purposes of this subsection. 
(4) Subsection (2)(b) above does not prevent the issue of any process in respect of 
property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes . . 
. . 
1978, c. 33, § 13 (U.K.). 
 133.  Reinisch, supra note 71, at 804–06 (citing the 1972 European Convention on State 
Immunity, the 1982 Draft Convention on State Immunity, the 1991 IDI Resolution, and the 2004 UN 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property).   
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governmental purposes.”134  
Property serving a public purpose, such as embassy premises, embassy 
bank accounts, cultural centers, military equipment in use as such, and 
central bank funds, has been held immune from attachment.135  Each 
category of property, however, does not carry absolute immunity; 
pragmatically, instances of mixed-use movable and immovable property 
require sensitive judicial inquiry into the affairs of foreign missions.136  This 
inquiry may carry a risk-averse deference to international comity.137  Indeed, 
state-owned property carries a rebuttable presumption in favor of public 
purpose in various countries including Germany, Austria, France, England, 
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.138 
In AIG Capital Partners, Inc. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, England’s 
High Court of Justice denied execution of AIG’s ICSID award of nearly $10 
million through the attachment of cash and securities held in London by the 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) through a private third party.139  The 
parties disputed whether securities held by the third party were property of 
the NBK (which, in turn, would render the assets immune under Section 14 
of the SIA140), and if not, whether, because the assets were invested in 
 
 134.  Id. at 835; see id. at 836 (“[T]he law of state immunity from enforcement has proved to be a 
field of positive judicial cross-fertilization.”); see, e.g., id. at 833 (discussing failed attempts by a 
party seeking enforcement of an arbitral award in France by attachment of overflight charges owed 
to the debtor state Yugoslavia by the French national airline; the court held the assets were not 
subject to attachment due to the direct relationship with the exercise of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty).  
For a detailed review of recent case law across Europe addressing matters of enforcement and 
execution immunity, see generally id. at 807–34. 
 135.  See id. at 824–33.   
 136.  See id. at 829 (“Many European courts have been very reluctant to question the 
characterization of the purpose of assets provided by defendant states.”). 
 137.  See id. at 831 (citing an opinion of the Dutch Council of State wherein they defended their 
reliance on a declaration by the Turkish government that assets subject to attachment were for public 
purposes as a sufficient basis for affording immunity by noting that to request a detailed accounting 
of the Turkish mission would amount to an “unjustified interference in the internal affairs of [the] 
mission.”); see also State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 13(5) (U.K.) (providing the authority to the 
head of a state’s diplomatic mission to certify that assets are public, and that such certification shall 
create a rebuttable presumption that immunity applies). 
138.   See Reinisch, supra note 71, at 829–33. 
 139.  AIG Capital Partners, Inc. v. Republic of Kazakhstan (AIG, Inc.), [2005] EWHC (Comm) 
2239, [1], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1420 (Eng.). 
 140.  Section 14(4) provides:  
Property of a State’s central bank or other monetary authority shall not be regarded for 
the purposes of subsection (4) of section 13 above as in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes; and where any such bank or authority is a separate entity 
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actively traded securities, they were “in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes.”141  The court focused on the meaning of “property” 
within the construction of the SIA and defined the term broadly, holding that 
any asset in which a state’s central bank has a legal, equitable, or contractual 
interest is immune from use in enforcement proceedings.142  In dicta, the 
court noted how this categorical bar on execution against property of a 
central bank preserves good relations between states and avoids the 
intrusiveness that would accompany attempts to classify funds as 
commercial.143   
Notwithstanding the assets being property of the central bank, the court 
also found they were not used for commercial purposes under Section 13(4) 
of the SIA.144  The court rejected the claimants’ argument that a portion of 
the assets were used in financial transactions with the aim of making profits 
and therefore met the SIA definition of commercial purposes145 and instead 
viewed the transactions as part of the exercise of sovereign authority.146  
Adding insult to injury, the court found the certificate provided by the 
Ambassador that stated the assets were not used for commercial purposes 
provided “clear and unambiguous” evidence of that fact.147 
The saga of Franz Sedelmayer is perhaps the most widely publicized 
story in investment arbitration and offers one of the few (and likely most 
hard fought) victories by an investor against a recalcitrant state.148  Mr. 
Sedelmayer, a German businessman, filed a dispute with the SCC, pursuant 
to the existing Germany–Russia BIT, claiming expropriation of his 
investments in Russia.149  The SCC rendered a $2.3 million award in favor of 
 
subsections (1) to (3) of that section shall apply to it as if references to a State were 
references to the bank or authority. 
State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 14 (U.K.). 
 141.  AIG Inc., [2005] EWHC (Comm) 2239, [27], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1420 (Eng.). 
 142.  Id. at [45].  
 143.  Id. at [82]. 
 144.  Id. at [92]. 
 145.  Id.; see State Immunity Act 1978, c. 33, § 13(4) (U.K.); accord id. §§ 3, 17. 
 146.  AIG Inc., [2005] EWHC (Comm) 2239, [92], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1420 (Eng.). 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  See infra notes 149–65 and accompanying text. 
 149.  See Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme  Court] 2011-07-01 Ö 170-10 (Swed.)   
(Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation) (unofficial translation), available at 
http://www.arbitration.sccinstitute.com/files/108/1081823/%C3%96170-10_eng%20(3).pdf; accord 
Baltag, supra note 44, at 411–12 (summarizing Mr. Sedelmayer’s legal proceedings against Russia 
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Mr. Sedelmayer in 1998, which Russia immediately challenged in Swedish 
courts, but to no avail.150  That failed challenge led to an extended battle—
lasting over ten years—in the Swedish courts while Mr. Sedelmayer sought 
to execute the court order awarding costs against Russian-owned property.151 
In Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of Sweden 
upheld the decision by the Svea Court of Appeal that a property in Sweden, 
owned by the Russian Federation but used mainly for purposes non-official 
in nature, was not immune from attachment.152  The Supreme Court relied 
heavily on the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and Their Property (UN Convention), which the Swedish government voted 
in favor of adopting in 2009 but does not yet carry the force of law.153  The 
UN Convention provides that sovereign-held property may be subject to 
enforcement measures if the property is “specifically in use or intended for 
use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes.”154  
The court interpreted this provision to mean state property “which is to a 
substantial extent . . . used as premises for the state’s officials (or for a 
different official use . . .) should be covered by immunity from enforcement 
measures.”155  However, where property is used in part for official purposes 
but mainly for “other purposes represented by the foreign state, [or] 
purposes that are a prerequisite to or consequence of a state run operation 
that is commercial or otherwise non-official in nature,” the question 
becomes whether the different purposes “together make up the specific 
nature that is required to safeguard the property.”156  The court, thus, broke 
from the traditional commercial/noncommercial dichotomy and held that 
state-owned property used for noncommercial uses may not be immune from 
attachment.157 
 
in Germany). 
 150.  See Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation ¶¶ 1, 25.   
 151.  See generally Pal Wrange, Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 347, 347–
53 (2012).  As an important aside, had the Germany–Russia BIT called for ICSID arbitration, Russia 
would not have had the ability to challenge the award in court, and the decade-long battle to receive 
costs as ordered by the Swedish court would not have ensued.  This is a clear example of how ICSID 
is a more efficient system compared to forums such as the SCC.  See supra Part II.C. 
 152.  Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation ¶¶ 17–25. 
 153.  Id. ¶¶ 12–16.   
 154.  See id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added) (referencing the Convention). 
 155.  Id. ¶ 15. 
 156.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 157.  See Wrange, supra note 151, at 349. 
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Mr. Sedelmayer identified property previously used to house the 
Russian trade delegation but at the time of assessment served as a housing 
property consisting of forty-eight apartments, only seventeen of which were 
used for diplomatic purposes.158  The court determined the remaining 
apartments, rented at cost by students and researchers from Russia or by 
Russians with official business in Sweden, “were of non-commercial, but 
also non-official nature.”159  In sum, the property was not used to a 
substantial extent for official purposes, and the cumulative effect of the non-
official uses was not “of such specific nature as to grant the property 
immunity from enforcement.”160 
Prior to the ruling by the Swedish Supreme Court, Mr. Sedelmayer 
initiated a host of legal proceedings in German courts.161  Mr. Sedelmayer 
failed in his attempts to attach the Russian embassy’s tax return claims and 
in a separate attack on Russian claims for overflight fees against the airline 
Lufthansa—German courts held both assets were protected on grounds of 
sovereign immunity.162  In 2006, Mr. Sedelmayer finally received a court 
order allowing seizure of rental payments from a former KGB property 
converted into an apartment complex.163  Mr. Sedelmayer, as of early 2012, 
 
 158.  Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation ¶¶ 19, 21. 
 159.  Id. ¶ 22. 
 160.  Id. ¶¶ 23–24 (finding claims for rent paid to the Russian Government to be of a commercial 
nature and not for official use).  During the pendency of this decision, the Russian Federation 
submitted that plans existed to restrict residency in the property to those who had diplomatic 
immunity.  See id. ¶ 19.  The court deferred to the international customary law practice of using the 
assessment of the Enforcement Authority from 2005, issued in response to the original claim, and 
did not take into consideration what one could view as attempts to decommercialize the property in 
efforts to preserve immunity.  See id. ¶ 20.  The court’s ruling paved the way for Mr. Sedelmayer to 
collect payment due to him by distraint of the property itself or the rental payments from residents 
therein.  See id. ¶ 25. 
 161.  See Baltag, supra note 44, at 411–12; see also Noah Rubins & Azizjon Nazarov, Investment 
Treaties and the Russian Federation: Baiting the Bear?, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 100, 106–07 (2008) (using 
the Sedelmayer saga as an example of the very limited success investors have had in settling disputes 
with the recalcitrant Russian Federation).  
 162.  See Baltag, supra note 44, at 411–12. 
 163.  See Rubins & Nazarov, supra note 161, at 107.  With his success in Germany, Mr. 
Sedelmayer earned the distinction of being one of the few foreign creditors of Russia to receive 
payment.  See also James Kimer, Russian Property Seized for Auction in Germany, 
ROBERTAMSTERDAM.COM (Mar. 21, 2008), http://robertamsterdam.com/2008/03/russian_property_ 
seized_for_auction_in_germany/ (the German court authorized a public auction of the apartment 
building in Cologne in 2008).  Interestingly, Russian media in a 2010 article referred to the auction 
and confused matters by alleging a Kremlin-controlled firm won the auction and avoided payments 
with Kremlin-provided funds.  Nikolaus von Twickel, Swedish Judge Orders Seizure of State Assets, 
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claimed he had only recuperated approximately $1.6 million dollars, and 
says he has over $6 million to go in order to settle all Russian debts owed to 
him.164  His treasure hunt continues.165   
B.  The Need for a Non-Judicial Solution 
Sovereign immunity evidently presents a formidable obstacle in the path 
of investors seeking the fruit of their arbitral award.  The ICSID enforcement 
mechanism, while more streamlined than any competing alternatives,166 
stops short of providing reliable means of award satisfaction.167  Dependence 
on national courts offers awardees access to the full force of the law, so long 
as an investor can successfully identify state assets and overcome the 
defense of sovereign immunity.168  Although aesthetically pleasing to most 
states, the amorphous sovereign immunity landscape is an eyesore for 
investors.169  There is movement in the direction of uniformity, yet 
uniformity in sovereign immunity law may prove to be an oxymoron; 
Sedelmayer v. Russia provides fair warning of the idiosyncratic 
interpretations that are likely to take place in different jurisdictions adopting 
 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, http://sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=32743.  
The article quoted a spokesman from the Office for Presidential Affairs who reported that “the 
Russian state has not paid Sedelmayer ‘a single kopek.’”  Id.  The same spokesman believed the 
decision of the Svea Court of Appeals in Sweden, which was later affirmed in 2011 by the Swedish 
Supreme Court, represented “a lowest-tier decision that will hardly be upheld.”  See id.   
 164.  James Kimer, How to Make Russia Pay its Debts: An Interview with Franz Sedelmayer, 
ROBERTAMSTERDAM.COM (Feb. 1, 2012), http://robertamsterdam.com/2012/02/how-to-make-russia-
pay-its-debts-an-interview-with-franz-sedelmayer/.  
 165.  See id. (discussing a failed attempt in Germany in 2011 where a court held the Russian 
House of Science and Culture, 90% of which Mr. Sedelmayer alleged was utilized for commercial 
activities of companies and retailers, was immune from attachment); see also Robert Amsterdam, 
Sweden Buckles Under Russian Pressure on Arbitration, EURASIAREVIEW.COM (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.eurasiareview.com/18042012-sweden-buckles-under-russian-pressure-on-arbitration-
oped/ (highlighting diplomatic tension between Sweden and Russia caused by the ordered auction of 
the property subject to seizure in Stockholm). 
 166.  See supra Part II.C.  
 167.  See REED, ET AL., supra note 20, at 190. 
 168.  As Mr. Sedelmayer has shown, where there is a will (and sufficient financial resources), 
there is a way.  See supra notes 148–165 and accompanying text. 
 169.  Compare supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting how the FSIA focuses on the nature 
of conduct, and not its purpose, in defining commercial property), with supra, note 132 and 
accompanying text (noting how the SIA focuses on the purpose of a transaction or activity in 
classifying property as commercial or non-commercial), and supra note 156 and accompanying text 
(breaking from the commercial/non-commercial dichotomy all together).   
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any such “uniform” law.170 
In addition to producing inconsistent and unpredictable results, reliance 
on the courts implicates the foreign policy of the state where investors seek 
execution.171  National courts often undertake the sensitive balancing of 
international comity with justice for injured parties in the course of civil 
adjudication, but without an injured party having some connection to the 
forum the scales of justice are prone to imbalance.172  Under the ICSID 
system, a national court in a Contracting State has no choice but to avail 
itself of the dispute between a recalcitrant state and a foreign investor who 
maintains no connection whatsoever with the forum.173  The choices are to 
grant the foreign investors access to state-owned assets held in the country—
no doubt implicating the foreign relations with the debtor-state—or shield 
the assets of the recalcitrant state that are in one way or another contributing 
to the economy of the nation therein.174  The likelihood of successful 
execution of an award, therefore, may be tied to the degree of independence 
of the judiciary and the susceptibility thereof to political pressure to protect 
the employed assets of sovereign states.175   
IV.  JUDGE, JURY, AND EXECUTOR: TAKING ICSID AWARDS TO THE 
(WORLD) BANK 
ICSID’s success is anchored by its unique a-national arbitration model.  
 
 170.  See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text. 
 171.  See supra Parts III.A.1–2. 
 172.  Cf., e.g., Chabad v. Russian Federation, 915 F. Supp. 2d 147, 147–49, 153–55 (D.D.C. 
2013) (granting a motion for civil contempt sanctions against the Russian Federation 
notwithstanding the statement of interest by the United States claiming an award of sanctions would 
“risk damage to significant foreign policy interests”). 
 173.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 54. 
 174.  Even if the assets are public, such as embassy bank accounts used to finance the foreign 
mission, positive economic externalities abound (most noticeably from the activities of the 
employees of the mission as well as the physical properties themselves). 
 175.  But see Basil Katz, Tweak to U.S. Bill on Iran Sanctions Opens Door to Damages, REUTERS 
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/24/us-usa-iran-idUSBRE87N0TM20120-
824 (describing the rare legislation Congress passed that created a statutory exception to the normal 
sovereign immunity framework under the FSIA thereby facilitating attempts of identified creditors 
of Iran currently seeking to execute a $1.75 billion judgment against Iranian assets held in the United 
States) (citing Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10-cv-04518 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 8, 2010)).  
Commentators believe Iran may be able to challenge the statute as a violation of separation of 
powers given the appearance of legislative interference with judicial matters.  See id.; cf. Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 502, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012).   
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The ICSID Convention allows investors and Contracting States to settle their 
disputes in an independent forum that minimizes the nationalist fears of 
investors and the capitalist fears of host states.176  Although the ICSID 
process allows an investor to take the dispute out of the host state, due to the 
lack of an execution mechanism, the host state never quite loses control over 
the dispute.  Ultimately, a state decides whether it will honor an arbitral 
award, and if it says, “go fish,” the investor is on his or her own.  Thus, the 
nationalist fears held in abeyance by ICSID can quickly come crashing down 
on an investor.  Although proposed solutions on how to alleviate the 
sovereign immunity obstacles to award satisfaction abound,177 the simplest 
and most effective solution may be to solve the problem “in-house” by 
supplementing the ICSID enforcement mechanism with a World Bank 
Group execution mechanism. 
A.  Compliance Check Revisited: Characteristics of Recalcitrant States 
An effective solution must account for the source and scope of the issue.  
This Comment identifies ten countries that have refused to comply with 
investment arbitration awards rendered through either ICSID or alternative 
arbitration forums: Congo,178 Senegal,179 Liberia,180 Russia,181 Argentina,182 
Kazakhstan,183 Kyrgyzstan,184 Thailand,185 Laos,186 and Zimbabwe.187  Other 
countries, particularly those that recently denounced the ICSID 
Convention—Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela—may also prove reluctant to 
honor the potentially crippling amount of liability resulting from the number 
 
 176.  REED, ET. AL., supra note 20, at 4–5. 
 177.  See, e.g., Bjorklund, supra note 5, at 229–38 (suggesting changes in international law, 
changes in municipal law, changes in investors’ strategies, home state assistance, and multilateral 
pressure); Foster, supra note 51, at 724–29 (providing proposed amendments to the FSIA and, 
alternatively, an international convention to pay amounts due to creditors). 
 178.  See supra note 71. 
 179.  See supra note 47. 
 180.  See supra note 110. 
 181.  See supra note 149. 
 182.  See supra note 60. 
 183.  See supra note 139. 
 184.  See supra note 46. 
 185.  See supra note 46. 
 186.  See supra note 102. 
 187.  See supra note 85. 
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of pending ICSID claims.188  To categorize these countries in a uniform 
manner is a difficult task.  For example, gross domestic product (GDP) at 
purchasing power parity (PPP), as reported by the CIA World Factbook, 
varies from roughly $2.7 billion (Liberia) (ranked 185 out of 229 measured 
economies) to over $2.5 trillion (Russia) (ranked seventh).189  Adjusting for 
population, these countries do not fare as well: none of the ten recalcitrant 
states remain among the top fifty world economies, and the majority fall into 
the bottom half.190   
One bright line of demarcation between compliant and noncompliant 
states is that no state that has rebuffed an award is considered a developed 
economy according to UNCTAD.191  Indeed, the identified countries are all 
either developing or transitioning economies and are found in either Africa 
(Liberia, Senegal, Congo, Zimbabwe), Asia (Laos, Thailand, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia), or South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela).192  Another identifier all these countries share is that they are all 
members of—and have paid-in capital stock with—the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).193  Additionally, as either 
developing or transitioning economies, the majority of the countries 
identified herein as noncompliant states also maintain outstanding loans with 
IBRD or the International Development Association (IDA).194 
B.  The Role of the World Bank Group 
The World Bank Group comprises five institutions (collectively, the 
Bank) that function together to accomplish the enduring mission of 
 
 188.  See Ripinsky, supra note 38. 
 189.  GDP Purchasing Power Parity, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi 
cations/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 190.  Id.; GDP-Per Capita (PPP), CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi 
cations/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 191.  See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 2, at ii (describing, inter alia, which 
countries are “developed”). 
 192.  See, e.g., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 2, at Annex table I.1 (FDI flows, 
by region and economy, for the period of 2006–2011). 
 193.  See INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTR. & DEV., WORLD BANK, MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION & 
ANALYSIS AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 55–58 (2012) [hereinafter IBRD MDA], available at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/IBRD_MDA_and_Financial_Statements_June_2012.pdf. 
 194.  See id. at 52–53. 
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promoting economic growth and eradicating poverty.195  In addition to 
ICSID, World Bank Group affiliates include the two development banks—
IBRD and IDA—as well as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).196  With its 
diversity of services and depth of financial strength, the World Bank Group 
stands in a unique position to offer the international community a 
delocalized, a-national approach to removing the sovereign immunity 
obstacles that encumber the free flow of foreign direct investment.  Indeed, 
the Bank offers prophylactic and remedial measures to mitigate the risk of 
noncompliance with arbitration awards.197  But the Bank can do more to 
achieve a multilateral execution mechanism, particularly for awards 
rendered by its own institution, ICSID.198   
1.  MIGA: A Carrot for Investors 
MIGA’s mission “is to promote foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
developing countries.”199  MIGA offers investors a prophylactic measure to 
protect against political risks that threaten foreign investments, such as 
expropriation, breach of contract, terrorism, or war.200  Political risk is listed 
as the number one constraint for FDI in developing countries over the next 
three years—higher than access to financing, macroeconomic stability, 
infrastructure capacity, and others.201  Expropriation and breach of 
contractual obligations—including non-payment of arbitral awards—stand 
out as two issues that “remain the major preoccupations among foreign 
investors with operations in developing countries.”202  In the throes of the 
 
 195.   See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The World Bank at the Millennium, 109 ECON. J. 577, 580 (1999). 
 196.  See About, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).   
 197.  See infra Parts IV.B.1–2. 
 198.  See infra Part. IV.B.2. 
 199.  MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, WORLD BANK, WORLD INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL 
RISK 1 (2011) [hereinafter WIPR], available at http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR11.pdf. 
 200.  See generally id. at 21 (“Political risk broadly defined is the probability of disruption of the 
operations of companies by political forces and events, whether they occur in host countries or result 
from changes in the international environment.”).  
 201.  Id. at 19. 
 202.  See id. at 7.  Expropriation is defined as “the loss of investment as a result of discriminatory 
acts by any branch of the government that may reduce or eliminate ownership, control, or rights to 
the investment either as a result of a single action or through an accumulation of acts by the 
government.”  Id. at 21.  Expropriation is a broad-based category that includes regulatory takings, 
creeping expropriation, and nationalization.  Id. at 7; see also id. at 10 (“Political risk remains a 
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global economic recovery, data show expropriation is on the rise, and many 
investors believe these risks will continue to escalate.203  The impacts of 
these risks are tangible: in a recent survey,204 nearly 40% of international 
firms said they suffered a loss from non-payment of arbitral awards or other 
forms of breach of contract, and roughly 20% say both breach of contract 
and expropriation have a “very high impact” on their current activities.205 
MIGA insures against the very problem this article addresses—non-
payment of arbitral awards.206  This avenue for satisfaction of arbitration 
awards represents a readily available execution mechanism for investors to 
consider as an alternative to the treasure hunt.207  Although this solution 
comes at a price up front—insurance premiums—the costs may prove 
smaller than that required to pursue judicial attachment and execution 
proceedings.208  Thus, MIGA can serve as a dispute settlement mechanism a 
 
salient constraint to investment in developing countries, becoming more prominent over the next 
three years as current concerns about the global economy subside.”). 
 203.  Id. at 18.  The WIPR highlights increased expropriation in countries such as Belize, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Venezuela.  See also id. (noting a 41% jump in expropriations 
in Venezuela from 2010 to 2011).  But cf. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 2, Annex 
table I.1 (showing Venezuela attracted nearly five times the amount of FDI in 2011 compared to 
2010).  
 204.  The survey contains the responses of over 300 senior executives from multinational 
enterprises investing in developing countries.  WIPR, supra note 199, at 58. 
 205.  Id. at 64.  
 206.  See Investment Guarantees: Types of Coverage, MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, 
http://www.miga.org/investmentguarantees/index.cfm?stid=1797 (last visited Oct 3, 2013); see also 
WIPR, supra note 199, at 45 (“[Political Risk Insurance] protects against losses arising from a host 
government’s breach or repudiation of a contractual agreement with an investor.  Claims are usually 
payable only after an investor has invoked a dispute resolution mechanism (such as arbitration), has 
obtained an award for damages, and the host government has failed to honor the award.”).   
 207.  See, e.g., MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, SAMPLE CONTRACT FOR GUARANTEE OF 
EQUITY INVESTMENT 19 (2012) (“The guarantee against Breach of Contract shall cover a Loss that is 
a direct result of: (a) the inability of the Guarantee Holder or the Project Enterprise (on behalf of the 
Guarantee Holder) to enforce an Award rendered in its favor against the Host Government (‘Arbitral 
Award Default’), provided that the Guarantee Holder and/or the Project Enterprise, as applicable, 
have made all reasonable efforts to enforce the Award against the Host Government, including 
initiating and participating in appropriate judicial proceedings, for the duration of the Waiting Period 
. . . .”).  The terms of this coverage are vague and it is unclear what the standard is for “all 
reasonable efforts” during the time specified as the waiting period (which, in the SAMPLE 
CONTRACT, is 180 days).  Id. at 2.  
 208.  Indeed, investors are increasingly turning to political risk insurance as a safeguard for their 
investments.  From 2008 to 2010, political risk insurance as a ratio to FDI flows into developing 
countries increased from 9-14%.  WIPR, supra note 198, at 39.  As a baseline, empirical studies 
have provided that costs in investment arbitration can amount to more than 10% of the average 
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priori by way of reimbursing losses incurred by expropriation;209 or, 
investors may find they can receive higher damages through arbitration and, 
in the instance of noncompliance, present their award to MIGA for ex post 
facto relief.210 
2.  IBRD & IDA: A Stick for Noncompliant States 
IBRD and IDA work together towards the goal of “promoting 
sustainable economic development and reducing poverty in its developing 
member countries.”211  IBRD offers low-interest loans and guarantees to 
middle-income and credit-worthy lower income countries, whereas IDA 
offers no-interest loans and grants to the poorest of the Bank’s member 
countries.212  IBRD is owned and operated by its 188 member states,213 and 
as of June 30, 2012, had approximately $140 billion in outstanding loans and 
guarantees to developing countries and over $12 billion in paid-in capital.214  
The IBRD Articles of Agreement, to which each member country of the 
World Bank must subscribe, guide the policies of the Bank.215  Bank policy 
for overdue and non-performing loans is strict; non-payment leads to 
suspension of disbursements on all loans to the member country, and no new 
 
award, which amounts to over one million dollars—before enforcement and execution.  See Susan 
D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 776 
(2011); id. at 812 (showing, with a sample size of seventeen, tribunal costs alone averaged over 
$500,000).   
 209.  See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The 
Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 97, 113–15 (1986).  
 210.  Types of Coverage, supra note 206. 
 211.  See IBRD MDA, supra note 193, at 3.  IBRD and IDA share the same staff and headquarters 
and apply the same standards in evaluating projects.  See What Is IDA?, INT’L DEV. ASS’N, 
http://www.worldbank.org/ida/what-is-ida.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). 
 212.  See What Is IDA?, supra note 211. 
 213.  See Member Countries, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/ 
members (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).   
 214.  IBRD MDA, supra note 193, at 25.  IBRD raises most of its funds on global financial 
markets, whereas IDA relies heavily on contributions from developed countries.  See IDA 
Replenishments, INT’L DEV. ASS’N, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ida-replenishments.html (last 
visited Oct 3, 2013).  Membership of IDA is conditioned on membership in IBRD.  Member 
Countries, supra note 213. 
 215.  See generally INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTR. & DEV., ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT (2012) 
[hereinafter IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
EXTABOUTUS/Resources/IBRDArticlesOfAgreement_links.pdf. 
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loans are available to the member country or any borrower in that country 
until the member clears all arrears.216  If a member chooses to withdraw from 
the World Bank, or if the Bank suspends membership and does not restore 
the membership within one year, the Bank can use funds from a member’s 
capital account to settle debts as they come due.217  The Bank treats 
remaining losses from default as “country credit risk” and covers the losses 
with equity held by the Bank.218 
Of the thirteen countries identified in Part IV.A, all are members and 
shareholders of the Bank; six countries have loans outstanding from IBRD 
and seven have loans or credits outstanding from IDA.219  Because the same 
states that are refusing to honor arbitration awards are Bank shareholders or 
loan recipients,220 the Bank has the unique ability to offer either direct or 
indirect methods of effectuating award compliance.  Although the Bank is 
free to consider the political risk of the country along with other variables in 
determining whether to provide a loan or guarantee to a borrower,221 using 
the Bank to satisfy awards directly may require multilateral agreement.222   
 
 216.  See IBRD MDA, supra note 193, at 26 (Box 2: Treatment of Overdue Payments).  For 
example, the World Bank has suspended financial assistance to Zimbabwe due to arrears.  
Zimbabwe, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zimbabwe (last visited Oct. 3, 
2013). 
 217.  See IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 215, arts. VI §§ 1–4. 
 218.  IBRD MDA, supra note 193, at 25; see also IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 
215, art. IV § 7. 
 219.  See IBRD MDA, supra note 193, at 55–58.  
 220.  Compare id., with supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text. 
 221.  World Bank Operating Policy 7.40 provides: 
2.  If the Bank receives notice that a member country is unwilling to take steps to resolve 
a dispute over its failure to service external debt and if the Bank deems such failure to 
have a significant effect on the member’s creditworthiness or on its ability to implement 
Bank-financed projects/programs or service Bank loans, the Bank examines the 
procedures followed by the parties in addressing the issue and determines what action, if 
any, it should take. 
3.  If the Bank is seriously dissatisfied with the position taken by the member country, it 
may, at its discretion, decide not to make new loans to or with the guarantee of the 
member country until the country takes certain actions to rectify the situation. In making 
its decision, the Bank considers whether the circumstances of the default give rise to 
concerns about the member country’s creditworthiness for continued Bank lending. 
OP 7.40—Disputes Over Defaults on External Debt, Expropriation, and Breach of Contract, WORLD 
BANK, (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter WBOP], http://go.worldbank.org/WBOMT5JTU0. 
 222.  The Board of Governors that manages the World Bank Group comprises appointed 
representatives from each member country, who together “have the ultimate decision-making power 
within the organizations on all matters, including policy, financial or membership issues.”  Member 
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The Bank can attack noncompliance of any investment arbitration award 
through indirect means by suspending financing to the noncompliant 
member, similar to the penalties incurred by members for non-payment of 
Bank loans.223  Specifically for ICSID awards, treating the obligation to 
honor an award under Article 53 of the ICSID Convention as an obligation 
to the Bank would allow the Bank to impose the same penalties on members 
of the World Bank who default on awards as it does on those who default on 
loans.224  More directly, the Bank might be able to honor the presented 
awards and treat the amount either as an additional obligation owed to the 
Bank on top of existing outstanding loans of the noncompliant state or as a 
debit to the member’s capital account.225  However, converting the Bank into 
an ICSID award clearinghouse likely requires amending the Articles of 
Agreement; Article III provides: “The resources . . . of the Bank shall be 
used exclusively for the benefit of members . . . .”226  Those member states 
who would suffer from such an award execution mechanism would argue 
that use of Bank resources to satisfy awards is a breach of this provision.  
However, the counter-argument would be that mitigating political risk by 
satisfying awards does benefit member countries by increasing the supply of 
foreign investments.227  The Bank’s Executive Directors handle disputes 
regarding interpretation of the Articles of Agreement;228 if the clearinghouse 
 
Countries, supra note 213.  The number of votes each member country holds is dependent upon the 
number of shares held by the country.  See generally IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 
215, art. V § 3(a). 
 223.  See supra note 221 and accompanying text.  The Operating Policy allows the Bank to 
discriminate based on non-payment of investor–state arbitration awards in their loan-making 
decisions with member countries.  See supra note 221.   
 224.  Compare ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 53, with IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, 
supra note 215, art. VI §§ 2, 4. 
 225.  Giuliana Canè proposed an analogous solution—treating awards as a bond issued by the 
noncompliant state, which could be traded in financial markets.  See Canè, supra note 31, at 461.  
Under Canè’s approach, the Bank could serve as a purchaser of the “junk bond” and recoup the 
expenses either through direct debit of the noncompliant member’s capital account, or, more 
gradually, through higher interest rates on subsequent loan applications.  See id.  Similarly, George 
Foster proposed a solution entailing “a mechanism whereby eligible debts owed by member states 
would be automatically satisfied, without the need for recourse to judicial enforcement.”  See Foster, 
supra note 51, at 729.   
 226.  IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 215, art. III § 1(a). 
 227.  See Foster, supra note 51, at 728 (discussing the likelihood of increased investment flows 
following the creation of an execution mechanism that assured investors their losses would be 
recoverable). 
 228.  See IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 215, art. IX.   
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function proved to be ultra vires, a vote of three-fifths of Bank members 
carrying eighty-five percent of the voting power could amend the Articles of 
Agreement to allow the new function.229 
C.  The Feasibility and Risk of Flexing the World Bank’s Muscles 
Many attribute the low noncompliance rate of ICSID awards to the fear 
of falling out of favor with the World Bank and the implications on access to 
future loans.230  As the previous section details, the World Bank can apply 
the collective efforts of its affiliated organizations to effectuate ICSID award 
satisfaction in a number of ways.231  Nevertheless, noncompliance persists.232 
Consider application of these mechanisms to the dispute between AIG 
and Kazakhstan.233  AIG could have—and perhaps may have—purchased 
political risk insurance from MIGA to cover the risk of expropriation that 
did eventually give rise to the claim registered with ICSID.234  With a MIGA 
insurance policy, AIG could have filed a claim with MIGA and sought 
compensation for its losses.235  Alternatively, AIG could have pursued ICSID 
arbitration and, following non-payment, could have filed a claim with MIGA 
seeking compensation for the non-honored award.236  Kazakhstan also 
happens to hold nearly 3000 shares in IBRD, for which it has paid in nearly 
$20 million.237  Additionally, Kazakhstan is currently borrowing 
approximately $5 million from IBRD.238  The Bank could suspend 
consideration of all future loan proposals by Kazakhstan pending payment of 
the award to AIG.239  If the Bank treats the obligation to ICSID as an 
 
 229.  See id. art. VIII.  But see infra Part IV.C. 
 230.  See, e.g., Baltag, supra note 44, at 403–05. 
 231.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 232.  See Baltag, supra note 44, at 403–05. 
 233.  For the original discussion of this dispute, see supra notes 139–147 and accompanying text. 
 234.  Cf. AIG Capital Partners, Inc. v. Republic of Kazakhstan (AIG, Inc.), [2005] EWHC 
(Comm) 2239, [22], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1420 (Eng.) (noting that the ICSID award held that the actions 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan amounted to expropriation).   
 235.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 236.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 237.  IBRD MDA, supra note 193, at 56 (Statement of Subscriptions to Capital Stock and Voting 
Power). 
 238.  Id. at 52 (Summary Statement of Loans).  Of the $5 million, $1.1 million has been approved 
but is not yet effective, $1.6 million is pending disbursement, and the remaining $2.3 million is 
outstanding.  Id.   
 239.  See supra text accompanying notes 223–28. 
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obligation to the Bank, it could suspend loans not yet effective or amounts of 
loans in effect but not yet disbursed.240  If Kazakhstan remained obstinate, 
the Bank could pay the award out of its equity and debit Kazakhstan’s 
capital account.241   
Supposing the World Bank can offer all of these multi-layered solutions 
to investors, the question of whether it should do so remains.  Bank 
satisfaction of ICSID awards creates a perverse incentive for investors not to 
purchase political risk insurance from MIGA.242  A “less-carrot/more-stick” 
solution to this problem of mixed motives may include the adoption of a 
policy of equitable subrogation, whereby MIGA satisfies non-honored 
awards held by policyholders and holds the state liable for the award through 
its Bank accounts.243   
Additional questions arise for the Bank when presented with a situation 
such as the one posed by Zimbabwe,244 where the Bank has already ceased 
lending operations due to default on Bank loans—the amount of which is 
over twenty times greater than Zimbabwe’s amount paid in capital.245  
Although the Bank could add the amount of an ICSID award to the arrears 
that must be cleared prior to Zimbabwe obtaining another loan from the 
Bank, such a policy may quickly erode the financial strength of the Bank.246  
For countries whose paid-in capital is not impaired by loan obligations, they 
may choose to withdraw from the Bank and take their business elsewhere.247  
 
 240.  See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 241.  See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 242.  Investors may query why they should pay for what they can get for free. 
 243.  The Operational Regulations of MIGA provide for subrogation and assignment of rights.  
See MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, OPERATIONAL REGULATIONS Ch. 4, § 3 (2012), available 
at http://www.miga.org/documents/Operations-Regulations.pdf.   
 244.  For the background on this dispute, see generally Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, No. 
09 Civ. 8168(CM), 2011 WL 666227 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011).   
 245.  See IBRD MDA, supra note 193, at 53, 58. 
 246.  Opponents of this guaranteed ICSID execution mechanism might argue that it creates a set 
of incentives by both future investors and countries like Zimbabwe that is lose-lose for the Bank.  
Investors may have a greater incentive to invest in Zimbabwe because they know if a dispute arises, 
and they prevail, the Bank will honor the award.  From Zimbabwe’s point of view, it may be 
incentivized to continue to expropriate assets and refuse to pay arbitration awards that follow.  This 
is a grim scenario indeed; however, it is likely both parties’ respective incentives are overstated 
because investors invest to earn a profit, not recover losses in disputes (which they still must pay for 
out of their own pockets, and administrative costs of arbitration can be in the millions of dollars).  
See Baltag, supra note 44, at 400–01; see also supra text accompanying note 222. 
 247.  Alternative development banks include: the Brazilian Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the 
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If withdrawing membership from the Bank is too costly for the member 
state, an alternative step might be to withdraw from the ICSID Convention.  
ICSID already stirs fears of bias among developing states; enveloping the 
Centre with Bank policies may cause these fears to fester and infect the 
autonomy of the institution to such a degree that more and more states 
choose to denounce the Convention.248   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Matters are not improving for ICSID awardees.249  In the twenty-five 
years following the publication of the first ICSID award, investors initiated 
execution proceedings with respect to ICSID awards on only three 
occasions.250  Since 2000, investors sought judicial assistance in “cashing in” 
their ICSID awards against at least three additional countries.251  Not 
accounting for cases still pending,252 post-filing settlement rates for ICSID 
cases have declined by nearly 50%.253  For the sixty-nine concluded ICSID 
cases filed between 1978 and 1999, 38% settled before the tribunal rendered 
a final award.254  For the 184 concluded ICSID cases filed between 2000 and 
2012, 20% settled.255  In sum, more countries are refusing to honor awards 
while the number of disputes continues to rise and comparative settlement 
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  For more on these institutions, see generally 
John W. Head, Evolution of the Governing Law for Loan Agreements of the World Bank and Other 
Multilateral Development Banks, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 214 (1996). 
 248.  See Ripinsky, supra note 38, at 2.  For a more detailed discussion of the perceived bias of 
ICSID, see generally Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in 
Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825 (2011) (finding that, on the whole, ICSID awards are not 
statistically different from those rendered by alternative arbitration forums).   
 249.  See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
 250.  See REED ET AL., supra note 20, at 187–88 (discussing cases brought against the Congo, 
Senegal, and Liberia). 
 251.  See supra notes 85 (Zimbabwe in 2011), 110 (Argentina in 2012), and 139 (Kazakhstan in 
2005). 
 252.  As of October 3, 2013, there are 176 pending cases registered with ICSID.  See List of 
Pending Cases, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCase-
DtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (last updated Oct. 3, 2013).   
 253.  See List of Concluded Cases, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?re-
questType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded (last updated Oct. 3, 2013). 
 254.  See id. 
 255.  See id.  Twenty-three percent of cases concluded between 2000 and 2012 were discontinued 
for various procedural reasons.  See id. 
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rates fall.256   
Rather than watching investors struggle to circumnavigate the obstacles 
of sovereign immunity and grapple with the judicial risk accompanying 
execution efforts in different venues, the international community may be 
able to offer a transparent solution.  The World Bank possesses the ability to 
treat a multilateral problem with a multilateral solution.  Utilizing the 
collective strength and expertise of the World Bank Group can streamline 
award payments and help parties to investor–state disputes help themselves.  
Doing so will minimize sovereign immunity obstacles while simultaneously 
stoking the supply of foreign investments that ultimately promote the dual 
goals of the World Bank: promoting sustainable economic growth and 
eradicating poverty. 
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 256.   Note, however, that the settlement rates cited represent cased filed with ICSID and do not 
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